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Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be
Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?
Eric A. Posnert
Cass R. Sunsteintt

ABSTRACT
Many people believe that the problem of climate change would be best
handled by an international agreement that includes a system of "cap-andtrade."Such a system would impose a global cap on greenhousegas emissions
and allocate tradable emissions permits. This proposal raises a crucial but
insufficiently explored question: How should such permits be allocated? It is
tempting to suggest that in principle, a cap-and-trade system should allocate
permits on a per capita basis, with the idea that each person should begin with
the same entitlement, regardless of place of birth. This idea, pressed by many
analysts and by the developing world, can be defended on grounds of either
welfare or fairness. But on both grounds, per capita allocations run into
serious objections. If fairness is understood in terms of equally or
proportionallysharing the burdens of a climate treaty, per capita allocations
are not fair because they do not take into account all the effects of such a
treaty. Any agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will give more
benefits to some nations than to others, and will impose more costs on some
nations than on others; in these circumstances,per capita emissions rights give
the appearance but not the reality of fairness. For those who seek
redistributionto those who need help, on grounds of either welfare orfairness,
per capita allocations of emissions rights are at best a mixed blessing. Some
rich nations are highly populated, and some poor nations have small
populations; there is essentially no relationshipbetween size ofpopulation and
per capita wealth.
Copyright © 2009 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
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Per capita allocations would also create serious incentive problems, and
they would face decisive objections from the standpoint of feasibility: Per
capita rights would transfer hundreds of billions of dollars annuallyfrom the
United States to China and India, and the United States is most unlikely to sign
a treaty with that consequence. Per capita allocations must be compared with
other approaches, including those based on existing emissions rates and those
with self-conscious redistributive aims. Any system of allocation should
balance welfarist and fairness goals with feasibility constraints; per capita
allocations do a poor job of achieving that balance, and an insistence on that
approach might make it impossible for nations to agree on a climate treaty.
These conclusions have general implications for thinking about normative
goals and practicallimitations in the context of internationallaw.
INTRODUCTION

Many people believe that the problem of climate change should be
handled by some kind of international cap-and-trade system. 1 Under this
approach, participating nations, and perhaps the entire world, would create a
''cap" on greenhouse gas emissions. Nations would be allocated specified
emissions rights, which could be traded in return for cash. A system of this kind
might well be the most effective and efficient method of reducing emissions.2
By itself, however, the proposal for a cap-and-trade system does not
answer a crucial question: How should such a system allocate emissions rights?
It is tempting to suggest that the status quo, across nations, provides the
appropriate baseline. On one view, emissions might be frozen at existing levels,
so that every nation has the right to its current level of emissions. On a more
aggressive view, generally captured in the Kyoto Protocol, 3 all or most
signatory nations should reduce their emissions levels by a specified
percentage, again taking the status quo as the foundation for reductions. 4 The
status quo approach might have intuitive appeal, but it is also somewhat
arbitrary and raises serious questions from the standpoint of equity.5 Why
should climate change policy take existing national emissions, reflecting
existing national energy uses, as a given for policy purposes? Should a nation
with three hundred million people be given the same emissions rights as a
nation with one billion people, or forty million people, simply because the
emissions of the three nations, at the current time, are roughly equal?

1. See, e.g., RICHARD B.
POLICY (2003).

2.
3.

STEWART

&

JONATHAN

B.

WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE

See id.
See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,

Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
4. This is an oversimplification. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 87-90
(2007), for qualifications.
5.
WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD 149-168 (2000).
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Raising these questions, many observers have strenuously urged that in an
international agreement, emissions rights should be allocated by reference to
6
population, not to existing emissions. The intuition here is that every person
on the planet should begin with the same emissions right; it should not matter
whether people find themselves in a nation whose existing emissions rates are
low or high. Those concerned about the welfare of developing nations are
7
especially interested in per capita allocations of emissions rights. Why should
a poor nation with a large population be required to stick close to its current
emissions level, when wealthy nations with identical populations are permitted
to emit far more? Why should existing distributions of wealth, insofar as they
are reflected in current emissions, form the foundation for climate change
policy? More bluntly: Why should the United States be given emissions rights
that dwarf those of, say, India, which has a much larger population?
This argument might well be connected with a general "right to
development." 8 If the status quo is the baseline for allocating emissions rights,
See, e.g., NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COMMISSION, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA'S NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME 58 (2007), available at
www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChinaIUpFile/Filel 88.pdf [hereinafter CHINA'S NATIONAL
6.

CHINA,

CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME]; DANIEL BODANSKY, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE EFFORTS BEYOND 2012: A SURVEY OF APPROACHES (2004),

available at www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/2012%20new.pdf (describing several per capita
approaches); ANIL AGARWAL, MAKING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL WORK: ECOLOGICAL AND

available at
REGIME,
IN THE CLIMATE
AND EQUITY
EFFECTIVENESS,
ECONOMIC
AL., GLOBAL
ET
AGARWAL
ANIL
http://www.cseindia.org/html/eyou/climate/pdf/cse-stat.pdf;
WARMING IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (1991); TOM ATHANASIOU & PAUL BAER, DEAD HEAT
35
(2002); DONALD A. BROWN, AMERICAN HEAT 214 (2002); PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD

(2002); Ann P. Kinzig & Daniel M. Kammen, National Trajectories of Carbon Emissions:
Analysis of Proposals to Foster the Transition to Low-Carbon Economies, 8 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 183 (1998); Juliane Kokott, Equity in InternationalLaw, in FAIR WEATHER? 173, 188
(Ferenc L. T6th ed., 1999); Hermann E. Ott & Wolfgang Sachs, The Ethics of International
Emissions Trading, in ETHICS, EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 159, 159-68 (Luiz Pinguelli-Rosa & Mohan Munasinghe eds., 2002) ("The equal right of
all world citizens to the atmospheric commons is therefore the cornerstone of any viable climate
regime."); Ambuj D. Sagar, Wealth, Responsibility, and Equity: Exploring an Allocation
Frameworkfor Global GHG Emissions, 45 CLIMATIC CHANGE 511 (2000); Sven Bode, Equal
Emissions per Capita over Time-A Proposal to Combine Responsibility and Equity of Rights
(Hamburg Inst. of Int'l Econ., Discussion Paper No. 253, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftm?abstract id=477281; see also J. TIMMONS ROBERTS &
BRADLEY C. PARKS, A CLIMATE OF INJUSTICE 144-46 (2007) (describing international support for
the per capita approach); STEVE VANDERHEIDEN, ATMOSPHERIC JUSTICE (2008); Juan-Carlos

Altamirano-Cabrera & Michael Finus, Permit Trading and Stability of International Climate
Agreements, 9 J. APPLIED ECON. 19 (2006); Malik Amin Aslam, Equal Per CapitaEntitlements:
A Key to Global Participationon Climate Change?, in BUILDING ON THE KYOTO PROTOCOL:
OPTIONS FOR PROTECTING THE CLIMATE 175 (Kevin A. Baumert ed., 2002); Jeffrey Frankel,
Formulasfor QuantitativeEmissions Targets, in ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT 31, 40 (Joseph
E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007) (noting developing world demand for per capita system).
See, e.g., CHINA'S NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME, supra note 6; Altamirano7.

Cabrera & Finus, supra note 6; Frankel, supra note 6; Kinzig & Kammen, supra note 6.
8. See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess.,
Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (Dec. 4, 1986).
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poor nations are likely to have great difficulty in achieving the levels of
development already attained by wealthy nations. Perhaps a climate change
agreement based on existing national emissions rates would violate the "right to
development" even if it would be both effective and efficient.
The significance of this controversy can hardly be exaggerated. The
United States, long an obstacle to a climate treaty, finally committed itself at
the 2007 climate conference at Bali to negotiate a treaty with binding
greenhouse gas mitigation obligations. 9 Any eventual treaty will almost
certainly include a cap-and-trade system, as there is under the Kyoto
Protocol. 1 A cap-and-trade system has already been put in place in the
European Union, 1' and another is contained in bills currently before
Congress.12 Most notably, the per capita approach has been described as "the
most politically prominent contender for any specific, global formula for longterm allocations, with increasing numbers of adherents in both developed and
developing countries,"' 3 including India, China, and as many as 130 other
countries, and the European Union. ' 4 However, the United States has obliquely
indicated discomfort with the per capita system, arguing that developing
countries that are, or will soon be, industrial powers-including China, India,
and Brazil-will have to accept significant mitigation obligations in a climate
treaty. 15 It is unlikely, we will argue, that a per capita system will satisfy the
demands of the United States, one of the world's leading greenhouse gas
emitters on a per capita basis. Meanwhile, the per capita approach remains an
influential political and ethical paradigm for the distribution of permits because
it has not been subject to sustained challenge.
Our goal in this Article is to identify the problems with the per capita
system, in terms of both principle and feasibility, and to suggest that its current
prominence and popularity are undeserved. We suggest that advocates of per
capita allocations are correct on one point: In principle, there is little to be said
for basing emissions rights on existing emissions levels. The most plausible
9.

See Bali Action Plan,

1 (2007), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/

application/pdf/cpbali-action.pdf.
10. For good outlines, see STEWART & WIENER, supra note 1; NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra
note 5, at 145-68. For a brisk and illuminating treatment of policy questions involving the climate
change problem, with occasional reference to the Kyoto Protocol, see WILLIAM NORDHAUS, THE
CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC MODELS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2007),
availableat http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/dice mss_072407_..all.pdf.
11.
See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), About Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Clean Development
Mechanism, http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/index.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
12. See John M. Broder, Senate PanelPassesBill to Limit Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 2007, at A39.
13. See MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 270 (1999).
14. ROBERTS & PARKS, supra note 6, at 144.
15. See Press Release, The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Decision
of the Conference of the Parties in Bali on Climate Change (Dec. 15, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071215-1

.html.
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defense of this approach is pragmatic. Nations are unlikely to sign an
6
international agreement if they will be significant net losers,' and wealthy
nations might lose a great deal from any approach that does not use existing
emissions as the baseline for reductions. But this pragmatic point shows only
that powerful nations might well veto approaches that are better in principle; it
does not show that those nations would be correct to do so. As a normative
matter, an approach based on per capita emissions rights seems preferable to
one based on existing emissions; there are strong intuitive claims, rooted in
welfarist and other arguments, on behalf of such an approach.
As we shall see, however, a per capita approach runs into powerful
objections. We demonstrate this point by comparing the per capita approach to
several others, above all, those based on existing emissions and those with
explicitly redistributive aims. Most fundamentally, per capita allocations will
help some rich nations and hurt some poor ones. The reason is that some rich
nations are highly populated, and some poor nations are not. In fact there is no
17
If global
correlation between population size and wealth per capita.
redistribution or international justice is the goal, the per capita approach is a
highly imperfect means. From the standpoint of those who favor assistance to
poor people in poor nations, per capita emissions allocations are far less
attractive than they seem. In some cases, the per capita approach actually
creates perverse incentives. From the standpoint of global redistribution of
wealth-justified on grounds of either welfare or fairness-other approaches,
more directly focused on these central goals, would be much better. A key
point here, insufficiently appreciated in the current debate, is that any emissions
reduction agreement will impose a disparate array of costs and benefits, varying
greatly across nations; in these circumstances, a per capita approach turns out
to have far less appeal on reflection than on first glance.
Many people support the per capita approach not on redistributive
grounds, but on the basis of a simple and plausible appeal to fairness. " The
atmosphere's carbon-absorbing features are naturally thought of as a common
resource. Perhaps a common resource should be divided among all the people
in the world on the ground that all people enjoy a right to equal opportunity or
to equal human dignity. 19 Indeed, the same type of argument has been made
about mineral resources discovered under the high seas: as no particular state
"owns" these resources, they should be divided on a per capita basis. 20 And

16.

See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(2005).
17.
18.

See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Michael Grubb, James Sebenius, Antonio Magalhaes & Susan Subak, Sharing

the Burden, in CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE: RISKS, IMPLICATIONS & RESPONSES 318-19

(Irving M. Mintzer ed., 1992).
19. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
lstplen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
20. The Law of the Sea Convention provides that such resources be divided "equitably."
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given the constraints of national sovereignty, the resources should be given to
national governments on the basis of their states' share of the global population
rather than divided up among individuals directly.
We will show that the analogy to common property is at best incomplete
and obscures the relevant moral concerns. If we compare a climate treaty and a
treaty that provides for the exploitation of an underwater mineral deposit, we
immediately see that there is a crucial difference between the two settings. A
climate treaty, by reducing global warming, will have differential benefits and
costs for people around the world. While some people will benefit a great deal,
others will benefit much less or perhaps not at all. By contrast, exploitation of
mineral deposits has minimal differential effects. Per capita distribution of
greenhouse gas emission permits would distribute the revenues from the
abatement program on an equal basis, but would not equalize the overall effects
of that program.
In principle, the appropriate way to distribute permits is on the basis of the
aggregate effects of the climate treaty in light of standard normative theoriesemphasizing, for example, distributive justice, welfare, or fairness. From the
standpoint of those theories, and in particular on welfarist grounds, the per
capita approach does have major advantages over an approach based on
existing emissions because it would provide significantly greater benefits to
poor people. But the per capita approach would also have some unfortunate
incentive effects, which complicate the inquiry. Even if those effects are put to
one side, a per capita approach is far inferior to an approach that focuses more
concretely on what the right normative theory requires.
We shall also explore a series of pragmatic problems with the per capita
approach, including its incentive effects with respect to future international
agreements and population growth. A pervasive question involves feasibility.
The problem of climate change cannot be successfully addressed without an
international agreement that includes all or almost all of the major contributors.
Per capita allocations would have the effect of redistributing hundreds of
billions of dollars from wealthy nations, above all the United States, to
developing nations, above all China and India. For this reason, insistence on
per capita allocations would effectively doom any climate change agreement.
We offer some brief remarks about the relationship between this pragmatic
constraint and some of the underlying questions of principle.
Our conclusions are that on welfarist grounds, the per capita approach is
at most a crude second-best, and that it faces decisive objections from the
standpoint of feasibility. Insistence on that approach would effectively doom an
international effort to reduce the risks associated with climate change. And

However, that term has multiple meanings and is left undefined. See United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter Law of the Sea
Convention].
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while our focus throughout is on the problem of climate change, the analysis
will have general implications for issues of international law, where treaty
development frequently raises questions about the relationships among welfare,
fairness, and feasibility. 2 1 Despite those general implications, we should stress
that our goals are, in one sense, quite modest. We do not attempt to sketch a
climate change agreement here, and we do not mean to reach a general
conclusion on how emissions rights should, in fact, be allocated. In establishing
the problems with per capita allocations, we mean to take one step along the
way toward answering the most difficult questions about the relationships
among climate change, welfare, and justice.
Part I of this Article describes current and projected emissions rates of
major global contributors. Part II explains the subtle distributive effects of the
per capita approach, compared to other approaches. Part III, the heart of the
Article, shows that the per capita approach is unattractive on welfarist and
fairness grounds. Part IV argues that the per capita approach, even if appealing
in principle, is unlikely to be feasible.
I
AGGREGATE EMISSIONS VERSUS PER CAPITA EMISSIONS

In this Part, we provide relevant facts in order to provide a background for
analysis of possible allocation schemes. We are aware that particular estimates
are much disputed and that they are subject to change over time. Our principal
goal is not to insist on specific numbers, but to establish that there are dramatic
differences between national emissions in the aggregate and national emissions
on a per capita basis.
A. Aggregate Emissions
An international agreement might allocate greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions rights in many different ways. If existing national emissions 22rates are
used as the guide, a recent ranking across nations would look like this:

21. An especially helpful discussion is SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT
335-358 (2003).
22. Tables generated by World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool,
http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=yearly (last visited Aug. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Climate Analysis
Indicators Tool]. Excludes land use change.
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Table 1: GHG Emissions-Total C02 Emissions in 2004
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Country
United States
China
European Union (25)
Russian Federation
Japan
India
Germany
United Kingdom
Canada
Korea (South)
Italy
South Africa
Mexico
Iran
France
Indonesia
Spain
Australia
Brazil
Saudi Arabia
Ukraine
Poland
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
Netherlands
Kazakhstan
Egypt
Malaysia
Argentina
Venezuela
Uzbekistan
Czech Republic
Pakistan
Belgium
United Arab Emirates
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Millions of
Metric Tons
CO 2
5,888.7
5,204.8
4,017.1
1,575.3
1,304.2
1,199.0
856.6
551.3
549.1
507.0
482.2
427.9
415.3
407.6
396.7
368.0
355.1
350.9
346.2
342.9
329.6
304.0
276.6
238.5
229.2
187.1
178.4
152.2
149.2
145.6
140.2
131.9
125.2
125.2
119.2
104.0

GREENHOUSE GAS PERMITS
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37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Greece
Romania
Vietnam
Algeria
Nigeria
Iraq
Philippines
Austria
Korea (North)
Finland
Kuwait
Belarus
Portugal
Israel
Chile
Colombia
Hungary
Serbia & Montenegro
Sweden
Denmark
Syria
Singapore
Libya
Bulgaria
Switzerland
Ireland
Norway
Slovakia
Turkmenistan
Qatar
Morocco
Bangladesh
New Zealand
Oman
Azerbaijan
Peru
Ecuador
Cuba
Tunisia
Total for top 75 GHG emitters

98.8
96.1
91.8
91.6
85.1
84.4
80.3
76.8
73.1
72.1
70.5
65.9
65.1
63.8
63.4
61.7
58.9
56.7
56.1
52.6
51.7
50.1
49.8
47.4
44.6
43.6
42.4
39.8
39.5
39.1
38.5
37.5
33.1
31.9
30.9
29.6
28.2
25.8
23.8
30,674.1

It is evident that the world's leading emitters account for a strikingly large
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percentage of the world's emissions. Indeed, the United States and China, by
themselves, are responsible for about forty percent of the world's total. Most of
the world's nations, including many poor countries, are trivial contributors.
Estimates suggest that the largest contributors are likely to continue to
qualify as such. But major shifts will occur, above all with emissions growth in
China and India, and emissions reductions in Russia and Germany.
Table 2: Carbon Dioxide Emissions Changes, 1990-200423
Country
China
United States
India
South Korea
Iran
Indonesia
Saudi Arabia
Brazil
Spain
Pakistan
Poland
EU-25
Germany
Ukraine
Russia

% Change
1990-2004
108.3%
19.8%
87.5%
104.6%
110.7%
137.7%
85.6%
67.8%
59.0%
96.6%
-15.3%
1.6%
-12.2%
-47.1%
-24.8%

With these trends, we can offer a rough projection of changes to 2030. At
that time, the developing world is expected to contribute no less than fifty-five
percent of total emissions, and developed nations are expected to contribute
forty-five percent. 24 The United States is expected to be well below China.
Here is one projection of changes in emissions rates over time:

23.

Emissions of C02 from energy-related sources only. See Int'l Energy Agency [IEA],

C02 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION: 197 1-2004, 11.4-11.7 (lEA Statistics 2006) [hereinafter
C02 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION: 1971-2004].

24.

ENERGY INFORMATION

ADMINISTRATION,

OFFICE OF INTEGRATED

U.S. DEP'T ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/ieoO7/pdf/0484(2007).pdf.
FORECASTING,

HeinOnline -- 97 Cal. L. Rev. 60 2009

ANALYSIS AND

2007

93, tbl.Al,

2009]

GREENHOUSE GAS PERMITS

by
Table 3: Relative Contributions of Annual Carbon Dioxide Emissions
25
Emissions)
Worldwide
of
%
(Approximate
Country/Region

United
States
OECD
Eo
Europe
China
India
Japan
Africa

1990
23.5%

2003
22.7%

2004
22.0%

2010
20.1%

2015
19.4%

2020
18.8%

2025
18.7%

2030
18.5%

19.3%

16.9%

16.3%

14.6%

13.4%

12.4%

11.6%

10.9%

10.5%
2.7%
4.8%
3.1%

15.3%
4.1%
4.9%
3.5%

17.5%
4.1%
4.7%
3.4%

21.1%
4.2%
4.1%
3.7%

22.4%
4.4%
3.8%
3.8%

23.9%
4.7%
3.5%
3.9%

25.0%
4.9%
3.3%
3.9%

26.2%
5.0%
3.0%
3.9%

For our purposes, the most noteworthy changes involve the world's two
most populous nations, India and China, which will be responsible for nearly
one-third of the world's emissions in the relatively near future. And while this
projection is fairly recent, it is already outdated because of unanticipated
explosive emissions growth in the developing world. For example, China
United States in aggregate CO 2 emissions in June
apparently surpassed the
26
before.
perhaps
or
2007
It should be clear, from these figures, why developing countries are most
unlikely to be sympathetic to an approach that allocates emissions rights on the
basis of existing emissions levels. Their own emissions are expanding rapidly,
and such an approach would be especially costly to them because it would
force them to purchase emissions rights from other nations in order to develop
at current rates. For example, India is not likely to be especially enthusiastic
about the idea that if it is to develop at the rate indicated by "business as usual,"
it must spend a great deal of money to obtain permits from the United States,
Russia, China, or Japan. Notwithstanding this point, it might be tempting to
infer, from the numbers projected over the next decades, that an international
agreement should allow China and the United States roughly the same level of
emissions rights, and that the treatment of India should parallel the treatment of
Japan. An approach of this kind would build on that of the Kyoto Protocol,
which, as noted, requires percentage reductions from the status quo.
B. Per CapitaEmissions
The most obvious objection to the status quo approach is that the figures
for per capita emissions are radically different. On a per capita basis, China and
India emerge as far more modest contributors, ranking well below Barbados,
25.

See C02 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION: 1971-2004, supra note 23.

26. See Audra Ang, China Tops US in Carbon Emissions, BOSTON GLOBE, June 21, 2007
http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articies/2007/06/21/chinatopsus in
available at
carbonemissions.
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Croatia, Hungary, and Uzbekistan. To see the dramatic differences between
aggregate emissions and per capita emissions, consider the following:

Table 4: GHG Emissions-Tons C02 per Person in 200427
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Country

Tons CO 2
Per
Person

Qatar
Kuwait
Luxembourg
Brunei
United Arab Emirates
Bahrain
United States of America
Equatorial Guinea
Australia
Canada
Trinidad & Tobago
Saudi Arabia
Finland
Estonia
Oman
Czech Republic
Taiwan
Palau
Kazakhstan
Singapore
Netherlands
Belgium
Nauru
Russian Federation
Ireland
Korea (South)
Germany
Japan
Cyprus
Denmark
Austria
Israel
South Africa

50.3
28.6
25.8
24.4
24.1
22.9
20.1
18.0
17.5
17.2
16.8
15.2
13.8
13.3
12.6
12.3
12.2
11.9
11.9
11.8
11.5
11.4
11.2
11.0
10.7
10.5
10.4
10.2
9.8
9.7
9.4
9.4
9.2

27. Tables generated by Climate Analysis Indicators Tool, supra note 22. Excludes land
use change.
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34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Norway
United Kingdom
Greece
European Union (25)
Libya
Spain
Italy
Turkmenistan
Slovenia
New Zealand
Poland
Iceland
Slovakia
Serbia & Montenegro
Ukraine
Belarus
France
Seychelles
Bahamas
Malta
Sweden
Portugal
Bulgaria
Iran
Switzerland
Malaysia
Hungary
Venezuela
Barbados
Suriname
Uzbekistan
Antigua & Barbuda
Croatia
Lebanon
Romania
Macedonia, FYR
Jamaica
Mexico
Bosnia & Herzegovina
China
Chile
Lithuania
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9.2
9.2
8.9
8.8
8.7
8.3
8.3
8.3
8.2
8.1
8.0
7.9
7.4
7.0
6.9
6.7
6.6
6.5
6.3
6.3
6.2
6.2
6.1
6.1
6.0
6.0
5.8
5.4
5.3
5.2
5.1
5.1
5.0
4.8
4.4
4.3
4.1
4.1
4.0
4.0
3.9
3.8
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The most striking point here is that while China has become the world's
leading national emitter of greenhouse gases, its per capita contributions remain
modest, ranking it near the bottom of the list of the seventy-five highest
contributors. China's per capita emissions are merely one-fifth those of the
United States, making it natural to question whether the two nations should be
treated similarly in a climate change agreement.
The case of India may be even more pertinent. India's rapidly growing
emissions rank it among the world's leaders on an absolute basis, but its per
capita emissions are less than a third of those of China, about a sixth of those of
France, and about one-fifteenth of those of the United States, ranking it one
hundred twenty-second in the world.28
It should be clear that per capita allocations would produce radically
different distributional effects from allocations based on the national status quo.
Under a per capita system, the world's largest nations--China and Indiawould be significant net gainers. Indeed, their emissions rights would
undoubtedly be worth large sums of money. The principal losers would be the
nations that currently have high per capita emissions. The biggest loser, by far,
would probably be the United States; indeed, the losses to the United States
would likely be in the hundreds of billions of dollars. 29 (For a simple
comparison, those losses would, after a period of a decade, be well in excess of
the cost of the Iraq War. 3 ) Because of their high per capita emissions rates,
Canada and Australia would lose a great deal as well.
With this background, we should be able to glimpse the intuitive argument
on behalf of per capita allocations. Nations are not people; they are collections
of people. A citizen of China should not be given emissions rights that are a
small fraction of those of a citizen of the United States. Nor should a citizen of
India be given emissions rights that constitute a small fraction of those of a
3
citizen of Japan. Each person should count for no more and no less than one. '
As we shall see in Part III, this intuition might be grounded in concerns of

28. Id.
29. Under the status quo approach, the United States would be allocated about 20 percent
of the permits (see Table 7). Under a per capita approach, the United States would be allocated
about 5 percent of the permits (the U.S. share of the global population). Assuming that the price of
a permit is $30 per metric ton of CO 2 (the approximate price in the EU market for the first half of
2008) and enough permits are supplied to permit the output rate of 30 billion metric tons per year
(roughly the current global rate), then moving from the status quo approach (6 billion tons) to the
per capita approach (1.5 billion tons) would cost the United States about $135 billion per year.
These are back-of-the-envelope calculations intended to give a rough sense of the magnitude
involved, and should be taken with many grains of salt. See Mark Milner, Pollution: Value of
Global Carbon Trading Is Already Nearly Double Last Year's Figureat £3Obn, THE GUARDIAN,
July 9, 2008, at 43.
30. See Scott Wallsten, The Economic Cost of the Iraq War, ECONOMISTS' VOICE, Jan.
2006, available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l 134&context-ev.
31. See Altamirano-Cabrera & Finus, supra note 6, at 32.
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either welfare or fairness. But before we investigate these issues, it is necessary
to untangle some complexities. An initial task is to obtain a better
understanding of the effects of a per capita approach.
II

A COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT METHODS OF ALLOCATION
In this section, we briefly describe the distributive effects of the per capita
approach, and compare it to other approaches. Our goal is to show that in
important ways, the actual effects are not what might be anticipated.
A. Status Quo Approach

Suppose that a firm consumes energy and other inputs to create goods that
it sells on the market. Let us suppose that for every unit of energy that the firm
consumes, it generates greenhouse gases that have a social cost of $10.
32
One approach to greenhouse gas regulation would involve taxation. In
this example, the optimal tax would be $10 per unit of energy-the amount
necessary to ensure that the firm uses a unit of energy only when the private
benefit exceeds the social cost Alternatively (and identically), the firm could be
prohibited from consuming energy unless it bought a permit from the
government at a price of $10. Let us stipulate that if the permit is traded, the
price would be $10 as well.
Both the tax system and the permit system would raise revenue as well as
deter the emission of greenhouse gases. 33 In this example, each system would
generate revenue of $10 per unit of energy. That money could be spent in any
way; for example, the revenue could go into the treasury of the government that
levied the tax or sold the permit, and then used for ordinary budget
expenditures or to reduce general taxes. Note that the revenue raised would
partially but not fully offset the immediate loss to consumer welfare in the form
of higher prices. Firms would pass the tax along to consumers, who would
either pay the higher price (and have less money to buy other things) or buy
fewer energy-intensive goods. However, we assume that in the aggregate
people would be better off: the environmental benefits would exceed the
welfare losses from reduced consumption. 34 Otherwise, there would be no
reason to negotiate a climate treaty.
Now imagine that the world consists of two nations: Rich State and Poor
State. Rich State has a large economy and relatively few people, while Poor
State has a small economy and relatively many people. For concreteness, we
32. This approach is defended in NORDHAUS, supra note 10.
33. In the example, we will ignore the different effects of the systems on energy use. We
also assume throughout that the two different countries will distribute the permits allocated to
them in the optimal fashion, such as through an auction.
34. We bracket the question whether and how animals should be treated. See Wayne
Hsiung & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1695 (2007).
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might assume that Rich State is analogous to the United States and that Poor
State is analogous to India. Suppose that Rich State consumes 100 units of
energy at the time that the climate treaty goes into force, while Poor State
consumes twenty units of energy. (For simplicity, we assume that Rich State
and Poor State do not trade; citizens of each country consume the output of
firms in that country.) Rich State has five citizens, while Poor State has twenty
citizens. Thus, Rich State consumes twenty units of energy per citizen; Poor
State consumes one unit of energy per citizen. Table 5 displays this
information:
Table 5: An Example
Aggregate energy
consumption

Population

Energy consumption per
capita

Rich State

100

5

20

Poor State

20

20

1

As we explained earlier, the tax system would require the government of
each country to levy a $10-per-unit tax on each firm-that is, a tax equal to the
social cost of consumption of a unit of energy. Rich State would tax 100 units
of energy and receive revenues of $1000, while Poor State would tax twenty
units of energy and receive revenues of $200. Under the permit system, the
treaty would authorize Rich State to sell one hundred permits and Poor State to
sell twenty permits. As Table 6 shows, the distributive effects of each system
would be the same: Rich State would raise $1000 in revenue and Poor State
would raise $200 in revenue.
Table 6: Taxes versus Permits

Rich
Stat
StateI
Poor
Stat
LState

energy

unit of

consumption

energy

Tax revenues
(first column x
second
column)

100

$10

$1000

100

$1000

20

$10

$200

20

$200

Equivalent
permits

Permit
revenue
at $10 per
permit

We will call this the status quo approach because it takes as its baseline
the relative use of energy in the status quo. 35 If one thinks of the treaty as
"creating" permits, then the treaty would distribute more permits to Rich State
35. In the literature, this approach is often called the "business-as-usual," "historical
baseline," or "grandfathering" approach. See, e.g., ROBERTS & PARKS, supra note 6, at 139.
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than to Poor State because Rich State consumes more energy than Poor State.
The treaty would create a total of one hundred twenty permits, and give one
hundred permits to Rich State and twenty permits to Poor State. Note that the
effect of this treaty is identical to the tax approach described above.
As noted, the status quo approach to distribution is based on the amount of
energy consumption at the time the treaty enters into force; it is analogous to
36
the approach taken in the Kyoto Protocol. Because Rich State consumes five
times as much energy as Poor State, Rich State receives five times as many
permits as Poor State. And because wealthy countries consume more energy
than poor countries, the status quo approach seems to favor wealthy countries.
Of course, any judgment about whether particular nations are "favored"
depends on a baseline. Rich State will surely point out that its own firms pay
the revenue that it obtains from its extra permits, so that the effects wash out. It
is puzzling that a uniform emissions tax is not intuitively taken to be unfair
while the status quo approach to emissions rights is often found
objectionable-even though the two are identical in their effects. But at least it
can be said that the status quo approach will generally give more permits to
wealthy nations than to poor ones, holding population constant, simply because
wealthy nations tend to emit more greenhouse gases.
B. Alternative Approaches

Now let us consider some alternative approaches, including the per capita
approach. For example, under the per nation approach, the treaty would
distribute equal numbers of permits to every nation. Rich State and Poor State
would each receive sixty permits. This approach also does not seem intuitively
fair. All nations would receive the same number of permits, but they must
spread the revenues from the permits among different numbers of citizens. In
effect, Poor State's twenty citizens would receive three permits each; Rich
State's five citizens would receive twelve permits each, though it is unlikely
that the government would directly hand out permits to citizens.
The per capita approach seems much better on this score. Each nation
would receive permits in proportion to its population. In our example, the
climate treaty provides a total of one hundred twenty permits, so Poor State
would receive ninety-six permits and Rich State would receive twenty-four
permits. Each citizen in both countries would receive, in effect, 4.8 permits.
A final approach that we will consider will be called the redistributive
approach. Under this approach, all the permits would be given to whichever
country is poorer, at least up until the point at which wealth is equalized among
countries. If we assume that Poor State is sufficiently poorer than Rich State,
the redistributive approach would require that all one hundred twenty permits
be given to Poor State. Poor State would then sell twenty permits to its own
36.

See BARRETT, supra note 21, at 358-98.
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firms and one hundred to Rich State's firms, thus acquiring all the revenue
from the permit system. Table 7 displays the permit allocations for the four
approaches we have discussed:
Table 7: Four Permit Allocation Schemes
Status quo
Permits
Rich
State
Stat
Lstate II

Per nation

Per capita

Per
capita

Permits

100

20

60

12

20

1

60

3

II

PePermits
capita

Redistributive

Per
capita

Permits

Per
capita

24

4.8

0

0

IIII 96

4.8

120

6 I

Other approaches are possible, including mixed approaches that fall
between the various approaches described above. For example, one could
allocate permits on the basis of a formula that weights both population size and
poverty. 37 For simplicity, however, we will confine our discussion to the four
approaches described above: status quo, per nation, per capita, and
redistributive.
C. A Note on Ex PostEfficiency
From what we will call the "ex post efficiency" perspective (our reasons
for using this term will become clear later), all of these approaches are
identical, assuming that the trading system works as planned.3 8 Ex post
efficiency requires that energy users bear the social (climate) cost of energy
use. If that cost is $10 per unit of energy, then either a $10 tax should be used,
or states should create the number of permits such that the market price is $10.
All of our approaches allow states to set the price of the permits at $10 or
whatever the optimal price is, so they are all equally efficient.
The only differences among the approaches are distributive. As we saw,
under the status quo approach, Rich State's government would receive one
hundred permits and Poor State's government would receive twenty permits.
Rich State would sell those hundred permits to the Rich State firms, and Poor
State would sell the twenty permits to the Poor State firms. Under the per
nation approach, Poor State would sell twenty of the permits to Poor State firms
and forty of its permits to the remaining Rich State firms that were unable to
purchase the sixty permits distributed to the Rich State government. Under the
per capita approach, a similar outcome would occur. If Poor State would
37. See BODANSKY, supra note 6, for a long list of proposals that weigh these factors and
more.
38. For discussion, see NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 5, at 149-165 (showing that costs
of climate change agreement are greatly decreased with significant emissions trading).
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receive ninety-six permits, its government would sell seventy-six to Rich State
firms. The same would be true for the redistributive approach, as the Poor State
government would sell one hundred of the one hundred twenty permits it had
received to Rich State firms.
D. Distribution
We have seen that under the status quo system, Rich State would receive
one hundred permits and Poor States would receive twenty permits. Because
we assume that the social cost of consumption of a unit of energy is $10, the
permit price would also be $10. The governments of each state would sell the
permits, and receive revenues equal to product of the number of permits it sells
and the price per permit. Thus, Rich State would raise revenues of $1000 while
Poor State would raise revenues of only $200. By contrast, the per nation
system would give Rich State revenues of $600 from the sale of sixty permits
and Poor State revenues of $600 from the sale of sixty permits. The per capita
system, where Poor State is four times more populous than Rich State, would
give Poor State revenues of $960 from the sale of ninety-six permits and Rich
State revenues of $240 from the sale of twenty-four permits. And under the
redistributive system, Poor State would receive $1200 from the sale of one
hundred twenty permits and Rich State would receive $0.
These are points about distribution across nations. But it is also important
to understand the distributive effect of the various policies from a per capita
standpoint. Under the status quo system, Rich State would receive $200 per
capita, while Poor State would receive $10 per capita. Under the per nation
system, Rich State would receive $120 per capita, while Poor State would
receive $30 per capita. Under the per capita system, Rich State would receive
$48 per capita, as would Poor State. Under the redistributive approach, Rich
receive $0 per capita, while Poor State would receive $60 per
State would
39
capita.
To obtain a fuller understanding of the distributive effects of the
alternative approaches, we need to take into account the benefit side of the
climate treaty. The permit system would reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
resulting in mitigation of climate change. These benefits could be the same for
Rich State and for Poor State, or different. It is well known that the benefits of
40
reducing climate change are not constant across nations. Some nations have

39.
and $10.
40.

The figures are obtained by multiplying the per capita permit distribution from Table 7
See, e.g.,

CLIMATE CHANGE RISK REPORT: COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY RISK ANALYSIS
(2008) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE RISK REPORT]; WILLIAM R.

AND MAPPING: 2008/2009

CLINE, GLOBAL WARMING AND AGRICULTURE (2007); NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 5, at 91;

David Anthoff et al., Equity Weighting and the Marginal Costs of Climate Change (Fondazione
Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 43, 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=983032.
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far more to lose than others from, say, a 2.5 degrees Celsius increase in average
temperature, while other nations are likely to be net gainers from such
warming. 41 Under prominent projections, India and African nations are
especially vulnerable, and the United States and China have significantly less to
lose. Because of increases in agricultural productivity, Russia might even
gain.4 2 Here again we might consider both aggregate and per capita effects.
Suppose that the mitigation benefits of the treaty produce benefits of $2000 for
one state and $0 for the other state, or alternatively $1000 for both states. 43 In
the first case, if the benefits accrue to Rich State, then each of its few citizens
would receive a benefit of $400; if the benefits accrue to Poor State, then each
of its many citizens would receive a benefit of $100. In the second case, each
Rich State citizen would receive benefits worth $200 and each Poor State
citizen would receive benefits of $50. Table 8 summarizes the discussion so
far:
Table 8: Distributive Effects of Permit Allocation Schemes

System

Permits
(Rich!

Aggregate
Revenue

Poor)

Aggregate Net Benefits
R: $2000
P:
$0

R:
$0
P: $2000

R: $1000
P: $1000

Status quo

100/20

1000/200

3000/200

1000/2200

2000/1200

Per nation

60/60

600/600

2600/800

600/2600

1600/1600

Per capita

24/96

240/960

2240/960

240/2960

1240/1960

Redistrib.

0/120

0/1200

2000/1200

0/3200

1000/2200

Per
Capita
Revenue

Status quo

Per Capita
Permits
(Rich/
Poor)
20/1

Per nation

System

Per Capita Net Benefits

200/10

R: $400
P: $0
600/10

R: $0
P: $100
200/110

R: $200
P: $50
400/60

12/3

120/30

520/30

120/130

320/80

Per capita

4.8/4.8

48/48

448/48

48/148

248/98

Redistrib.

0/6

0/60

400/60

0/160

200/110

41. For an overview, see Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96
GEO. L.J. 1565 (2008).
42. CLINE, supra note 40, at 18; NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 5, at 91.
43. A related point is that the cost of adjusting to the implicit carbon tax may vary across
countries. Some countries have more abundant sources of clean energy, and some countries have
industries that can more cheaply switch to alternative sources of energy. For a discussion in the
context of the differential effects of per capita and historical approaches, see Joseph E. Aldy,
Divergence in State-Level Per Capita Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 83 LAND ECON. 353 (2007).
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The first panel of Table 8 displays aggregate figures; the second panel
displays per capita figures. The first figure in each cell displays Rich State's (or
Rich State citizens') gain; the second figure does the same for Poor State. The
Permit Distribution column displays the distribution of permits, as depicted in
Table 7. The Aggregate Revenue column multiplies these numbers by ten in
order to produce revenues from the sale of permits. The final three columns
display the net treaty benefits (revenue plus climate benefits) under the three
different assumptions about the differential impacts on the climate of an
effective climate treaty. The cells with bold figures show outcomes that are
most nearly equal for the two states.
One can immediately see that there is a large difference between
equalizing revenue (Column 3) and equalizing the net benefits of the treaty
(Columns 4-6). Focusing on per capita effects (Panel 2), we can see that the per
capita approach equalizes revenues, but it does not equalize treaty benefits
under any of the three assumptions, relative to the other approaches. Indeed,
equalization of revenues can occur amidst gross disparities in treaty benefits-a
point that raises serious questions about the idea that per capita distributions are
fair.
III
THE PER CAPITA APPROACH IN PRINCIPLE

We now turn to the arguments on behalf of the per capita approach. We
begin with welfarism, showing that that the per capita approach runs into
serious objections from that perspective. We also suggest that from the
standpoint of fairness, the per capita approach is much less attractive than it
initially seems.
In discussions about climate treaties, defenders of the per capita approach
argue that it is fairer than likely alternatives, such as the status quo approach.44
This argument is especially prominent in the developing world, where critics
ask: Why should wealthy nations be given an entitlement to their existing
emissions rights? 45 This question seems to be one of fairness, to which we will
turn in due course. But the question can also be translated into a plausible
welfarist argument, to the effect that the per capita approach is more likely to
increase social welfare than any imaginable alternative. It makes sense to begin
with the welfarist argument, which is in some ways more tractable, and which
will illuminate the fairness questions as well.

supra note 6, at 35.

44.

See supra note 6; e.g.,

45.

See, e.g., VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 6, at 226-39; Altamirano-Cabrera & Finus, supra

SINGER,

note 6, at 32; Sagar, supra note 6.
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A WELFARIST PERSPECTIVE

1. The casefor the per capitaapproach
Welfarists care about two things: maximizing the size of the pie and
distributing it equally. The larger the pie, the more is available for everyone to
consume; all else being equal, welfare should rise with consumption. 46 At the
same time, most welfarists believe that the welfare, or utility, obtained from an
additional good declines. 47 For instance, if you have zero apples, you would be
willing to pay a lot for one apple. If you have ten apples, however, you would
be willing to pay much less, or as little as zero, for an eleventh. Thus, if the
entire pie is given to one person, social welfare would not be maximized.
Ideally, the pie should be maximized, and then it should be divided evenly
among all members of society. This ideal situation assumes no disincentive
effects, which might decrease the size of the pie. We can easily see that if
disincentive effects are small, welfarists would advocate redistribution of
resources from wealthy nations to poor nations, or at least from wealthy people
in both wealthy and poor nations to poor people in wealthy and poor nations.4 s
With respect to maximizing the size of the pie, we observed in Part II that
the per capita approach is no less ex post efficient than any other approach. The
reason is that the climate treaty advances ex post efficiency by giving
individuals and governments incentives to minimize their emissions of
greenhouse gases. Optimal incentives will depend on the quantity of permits,
but not how they are distributed. As long as decision makers choose the right
quantity, the size of the pie will be maximized. Efficiency, in this crucial sense,
is not at stake in the choice among the four approaches.
Thus, the welfare effects of different schemes depend mainly on their
distributional effects; other things being equal, distribution to those who are
poor will increase welfare. 49 The per capita approach might well seem to have
attractive distributional effects and for that reason attractive welfare effects. To
the extent that more populous countries tend to be poorer, the per capita
approach will help poor people. Furthermore, under the theory that poor people
have the highest marginal utility for a dollar, helping poor people will
46. We put to one side some prominent puzzles about the relationship between happiness
and income. See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER (1999) (suggesting that relative wealth
matters, not absolute wealth); P. RICHARD G. LAYARD, HAPPINESS (2005) (exploring ambiguous
relationship between wealth and happiness).
47. See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (2005). Note that this approach assumes that interpersonal comparisons of utility are
possible. On that issue, see id.; INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster &
John E. Roemer eds., 1991).
48. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 6; Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist
Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2006).
49. There is another type of efficiency at stake, which we call "ex ante efficiency." We will
discuss this issue below.
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maximize global welfare.
Certainly compared to the status quo approach, per capita allocations
seem supportable on welfarist grounds; at first glance, a per capita system
seems to be the right way to proceed. The examples of the United States on the
one hand, and China and India on the other, are highly salient, because the
former is rich and the latter two are poor by comparison. To the extent that the
per capita approach would require the United States to give, in essence,
hundreds of billions of dollars to China and India, it might seem desirable on
welfarist grounds.
At the outset, of course, there is a serious complicating factor. Emissions
reductions will help future poor people, not present poor people. It is not
obvious that policymakers in wealthy nations should attempt to help future
poor people, who are likely to be far less poor than present poor people.5 ° If the
goal is redistributive, current poor people almost certainly deserve priority.
This point greatly complicates the claim that emissions reductions are justified
on redistributive grounds. Note, however, that we are speaking of emissions
rights, not emissions reductions, and emissions rights will benefit people who
are now living. For this reason, the redistributive argument, grounded in
welfarist considerations, has considerable intuitive appeal.
2. Objections and concerns
We have said that welfarists care about equal distribution, believing that
money has diminishing marginal utility. From their perspective, the per capita
approach has three serious defects.
First and most fundamentally, the per capita approach is attractive to a
welfarist only insofar as more populous states tend to be poorer. Not all heavily
populated states are poor, however, and not all lightly populated states are rich.
For instance, the United States is both large and rich, with a population of 301
million and per capita GDP of $46,000. Bhutan, on the other hand, is both
small and poor, with a population of two million and a per capita GDP of
$1,400.51 The per capita approach, then, seems to be a crude and even arbitrary
way to redistribute wealth, especially compared to the pure redistributive
approach, which gives few or no permits to rich states and all or most of the
permits to poor states, regardless of population size. We assumed away this
problem in our example in Part II because we stipulated that Poor State was
both bigger and (as befits its name) poorer. But that assumption is unrealistic.
Indeed, the relationship between population and wealth turns out to be
essentially zero. For a demonstration, consider Figure 1.

50. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 41.
51.
We take these figures from the CIA World
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
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Figure 1: Relationship Between Population and Per Capita Wealth
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Clearly, there are rich small states (upper left), and poor big states (lower
right), and everything in between. As Figure 1 shows, there is no statistically
significant correlation between population and per capita GDP.
Second, the permits-in the scheme that we describe in Part II-are
distributed to both greenhouse gas winners and losers. Some poor states will
become far poorer as a result of climate change; other poor states are less
vulnerable. 5 3 Similarly, some rich states will face serious adverse economic
effects from climate change; other rich states are less vulnerable. 54 Some states

52. The figure shows the natural logs of per capita GDP and population averaged over the
years 1980 to 2000. Taking the natural log of the variables makes the data points easier to see in a
manageable figure. The correlation coefficient between per capita GDP and population is -0.03 6

and is not statistically significant. The data are taken from
INTERNATIONAL

ALAN HESTON ET AL., CENTER FOR

COMPARISONS OF PRODUCTION, INCOME, AND PRICES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF

available at
WORLD
TABLE
VERSION
6.2
(2006),
PENN
http://pt.econ.upenn.eduphp.site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php.
53. Thus, for example, India is far more vulnerable than is China. See NORDHAUS&
BOYER, supra note 5, at 91; CLIMATE CHANGE RISK REPORT, supra note 40, at 17. Among the
most vulnerable nations are Somalia, Burundi, Yemen, Nigeria, and Afghanistan; other poor
nations, including Thailand, Colombia, Indonesia, and El Salvador, are significantly less
PENNSYLVANIA,

vulnerable.

CLIMATE CHANGE RISK REPORT,

supra note 40, at 17.

Thus, for example, the United States is far less vulnerable than many nations in Europe.
NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 5, at 91, and Canada is less vulnerable than the Netherlands,
Austria, and Germany, CLIMATE CHANGE RISK REPORT, supra note 40, at 17.
54.
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may even be net gainers from climate change. 55 If distribution is our concern,
why should two highly populated poor nations receive the same number of
permits from a program from which one nation would gain a lot and another a
little-or from which one would gain a lot and another would actually lose?
Ideally, permits should be distributed in light of these consequences, but the per
capita approach fails to take them into account.
Third, the permits are allocated to the governments of poor states, not to
the citizens of poor states. This distinction matters because nearly all poor
states have a class of wealthy elites, and these wealthy elites usually control the
government, or at least have considerable influence over it. Given that the
governments in these states already are unenthusiastic about redistributing
wealth from the elites to the poor, it is questionable that they will use the
wealth generated by the permit scheme to help the poor. They may well prefer
to help the rich. We will return to this problem in Part IV.
The intuitive attractiveness of the per capita approach depends on seeing it
in isolation from all of the effects of a climate treaty. Once we take these
various factors into account, the per capita approach appears far less attractive,
and on plausible assumptions, indefensible from the standpoint of the very
rationales that most justify it at first sight.
We agree that as a matter of actual practice, these defects are not
necessarily fatal to the per capita approach. Everything depends on the
alternatives. One might argue in response that while the per capita approach is
not ideal, it is still superior to a system that is its most likely alternative-one
that uses status quo energy consumption as the baseline and thus favors people
living in wealthy and wasteful countries. Perhaps this response is correct. But it
must acknowledge the underlying problem, which is that the per capita system
is only indirectly connected to the underlying normative goal-indeed, so
indirectly that it is conceivable in principle that it has worse distributive effects
than the status quo approach.
A welfarist should favor redistribution to the world's poor to the extent
that doing so is feasible and does not excessively reduce aggregate global
welfare. But there is no reason to think that the per capita approach to climate
regulation is the right way to redistribute wealth and thus to increase global
welfare. From a welfarist perspective, a sensible redistributive policy would
follow these general principles: redistribute all resources rather than shares of
the atmosphere's capacity to absorb greenhouse gases; redistribute resources to
poor people rather than to poor nations; and redistribute to poor nations rather
than to populous nations. If redistribution is to occur in the specific context of a
climate treaty, the redistributive approach, sketched in Part II, would be much
better than the per capita approach.

55. See NORDHAUS &
gains for Russia).

BOYER,

supra note 5, at 91 (projecting, for example, significant net
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3. More on welfare: ex ante efficiency
Arguments in favor of per capita distribution have, so far, focused on what
we have called ex post efficiency effects, and neglected the possible ex ante
effects of the distribution scheme. We discussed the ex post effects above, and
showed that the ex post efficiency effects of the different schemes are identical
(or nearly so). The same cannot be said for ex ante efficiency. From that
standpoint, the effects are different, and the per capita approach has some
significant drawbacks.
To understand the difference between ex post and ex ante efficiency,
recall that any tax or cap-and-trade system that requires firms or individuals to
internalize the social cost of their greenhouse gas emissions is efficient, in the
sense that under these schemes firms and individuals will use energy only when
the social benefits (including their own profits or consumption) are greater than
the social costs (including the costs to the climate). We call this type of
efficiency "ex post" because it addresses an existing problem, though, to be
sure, one that will continue into the future.
On the other hand, the ex ante effect of a climate treaty refers to its effect
on future programs, including those that have nothing to do with greenhouse
gases. Any treaty will establish a precedent on which states will rely, at least in
part, as they negotiate additional treaties in the future: treaties that will be
needed to handle such global problems as terrorism, cross-border transmission
of diseases, and nation-building efforts in failed states. For example, if the per
capita approach is used for a climate treaty, then it might suggest itself as a
basis for allocating the costs of an anti-terrorism treaty.
Similar assumptions are routinely made about domestic programs. For
example, the U.S. government could alleviate poverty by announcing one day
that it will take most of the wealth of rich Americans and give it to poor
Americans. Such a program is not inefficient in the ex post sense: given that the
rich have already accumulated their wealth, they cannot retroactively be
deterred from working hard. The program will have prospective effect,
however. Even if announced as a one-time event, people will assume that if the
government implements such a program today, it might do so again tomorrow.
This assumption will influence their ex ante behavior, reducing their incentive
56
to work and save.
56. These effects are addressed in the law and economics literature on legal transitions, or
changes in the law. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99
HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986). This literature focuses on domestic law, where it is clearer than in the
international context that a government that adopts certain policies or practices toward legal
transitions--compensating or grandfathering those injured by the transition, for example-will
affect the incentives of people to anticipate legal change. We extend this literature to the
international setting; there is no reason to think that the differences in settings should affect the
analysis. The transitions literature ignores what we have called "ex post efficiency," instead
assuming that whatever legal change that is introduced is dictated by efficiency. The
environmental literature, by contrast, focuses on ex post efficiency (for example, the choice
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Suppose, then, that a climate treaty based on the per capita approach
established a precedent. How might such a precedent influence behavior,
compared to the status quo approach? It would create two perverse incentives:
encouraging population growth and discouraging economic growth.
First, the per capita approach would establish that the most highly
populated states would obtain the greatest benefits from international
cooperation. Governments would be rewarded for pursuing fertility policies
that maximize the size of the population. To see why, consider a state with
population X and another state with population 2X. Suppose that a future treaty
would limit the spread of infectious diseases, creating benefits of Y. The states
would need to negotiate a division of the surplus. With the per capita principle
in place, the state with the larger population would be able to claim a larger
portion of the surplus.
From a redistributive perspective, this result might seem fair (unless the
people in the larger state are richer), but in terms of prospective incentives,
states would have one more reason to grow and to avoid shrinking. This
incentive would be especially perverse from the perspective of climate change
because more people will consume more of the earth's resources, though the
exact effect of population growth is complex. On the other side, the climate
treaty, to the extent that it fixes the initial number of permits, will also restrain
growth. Given the relatively low amount of international cooperation, and
hence the relatively low amount of treaty-making, one might doubt that the
incentive to expand population in order to obtain future treaty advantages is
particularly strong. To evaluate the extent of the problem we need to know the
magnitude and not merely the direction of the incentive effect. Still, this
problem is a cost of the per capita approach that should be kept in mind.57
Second, to the extent that it favors poorer countries (and that is its only
normatively attractive feature), the per capita approach would establish that
poorer states would obtain the greatest benefits from international cooperation.
In the abstract this seems desirable, but governments that adopt policies that
promote economic growth would be penalized by this principle. Most rich
states get wealthy because they have good institutions, not because they are
lucky enough to have natural resources. 58 Citizens invest in creating and
between permits systems and taxes) and generally, although not always, ignores ex ante issues.
For a discussion, see Jonathan R. Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to
Environmental Grandfathering 18-22 (Jan. 24, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2650&context--alea.
57. These perverse population incentives have long been recognized. However, many
scholars seem to think that these incentives can be eliminated as long as allocations of permits are
made with reference to a past distribution of population rather than to future populations. See, e.g.,
SINGER, supra note 6, at 36. Such an approach would not address the perverse incentives of the
precedent for future treaties, when high-population states will invoke the climate treaty as a basis
for demanding more favorable treatment.
58. In fact, development economists have gone so far as to identify a "resource curse":
countries with valuable natural resources often do worse than those that lack them. See generally
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maintaining good institutions because good institutions deliver wealth and
other benefits. A redistributive principle such as the per capita approach
implicitly punishes states that do well economically, while rewarding states that
do poorly.
The goal of development aid over the past decades was precisely the
opposite: to give governments of developing countries an incentive to adopt
sound economic policies that promote growth. Because of fears that foreign aid
would provide incentives not to grow, donors made concerted efforts to
condition aid on the adoption of sensible growth policies.59 The per capita
approach-and indeed, any redistributive principle-is at war with the lessons
of development policy, and would weaken the pro-growth incentives that are
currently given to developing states.
What system, then, is optimal for ex ante efficiency? The ideal system
would give states an incentive to identify global problems in advance and
negotiate treaties to solve them without affecting their incentives to control
their populations, invest in institutions, and so forth. Our interest in that ideal
system is connected with International Paretianism; recall that this principle
means that states are unlikely to enter into treaties unless they believe that they
will not be made worse off as a result. 60
But treaties that solve problems generate surpluses beyond the amount
necessary to make states indifferent between entering and not entering a treaty.
What should be done with the surplus? It is tempting to think that one could
distribute the surplus without affecting incentives ex ante, but this is highly
implausible. If one could, then one would probably want to distribute the
surplus to the poorest countries rather than on a per capita basis, which, as we
argue, is morally arbitrary.
From an ex ante efficiency perspective, the best use of the surplus would
be to reward the states that had taken steps in advance of the treaty to abate
greenhouse gases. 61 These states would probably be the European states that
accepted binding emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol, though there
are complexities here, since not all European states accepted meaningful
reductions and others were simply taking advantage of independent
RICHARD M. AUTY, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES (1993).

59. See David Dollar & Victoria Levin, The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 19842003, 34 WORLD DEV. 2034, 2034-36 (2006) (describing this view as an emerging international
consensus).
60. The Pareto principle in economics refers to the idea that an allocation of resources
makes at least one person better off and no one worse off compared to some other allocation. We
do not attempt to specify here the ingredients of a state's judgments about what would make it
better off or worse off; we agree that some states have altruistic goals and so include, in their own
welfare, the welfare of those in other states.
61. Hence the scholarly support for banking systems under which any future climate treaty
would reward states that make abatement efforts prior to treaty ratification. See, e.g., Kinzig &
Kammen, supra note 6. For a discussion of the use of this principle in domestic environmental
law, see Nash, supra note 56.
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62
technological and demographic changes in their country.
The larger point is that such a distribution would establish a precedent to
the effect that when a global problem exists, states that respond quickly and in
advance of a treaty will not be penalized. With this principle in place, states
would be more likely to act quickly and to negotiate a treaty regime rather than
drag their feet. For example, if states ever need to enter a new treaty that
regulates cybercrime, they would know that first movers that have implemented
controls that reduce dangers to other states would not be penalized and would
even be rewarded in some way.
From the standpoint of ex ante efficiency, the per capita approach has
serious drawbacks, even when compared with the seemingly unattractive status
quo approach. As we have indicated, these drawbacks cannot be evaluated
without knowing the magnitude of the effects. If, for example, a climate change
agreement had small consequences for population growth, and had little effect
on incentives in the context of other international agreements, the drawbacks
would not be a substantial concern. Our point is only that these drawbacks must
be investigated in order to obtain a full account of the welfare effects of the per
capita approach.

B. From a FairnessPerspective
Ideas about fairness play a significant role in debates over the proper
approach to climate change. 63 Fairness can be specified in multiple different
ways. We venture three specifications here in an effort to see whether the per
capita approach can be defended on fairness grounds.
1. Fairnessand the veil of ignorance
Many scholars reject the idea that questions of global justice should be
approached in welfarist terms. 64 In their view, the goal is not to promote
aggregate social welfare; it is instead to do what fairness requires. Arguments
of this kind often posit a veil of ignorance, or "original position," from which
65
the principles governing allocations of resources might be chosen. In the
standard version of this argument, people behind the veil do not know various
circumstances of their lives; they do not know their place in society, or even
66
their natural assets such as intelligence and strength. The central claim is that

62. See Kathryn Harrison & Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, The Comparative Politics of
Climate Change, 7 GLOBAL EN VTL. POL. 1 (2007) (describing the differential effects of the Kyoto
Protocol on European countries).
63. Fairness concerns are the principal ones in the essays cited supra in note 6. For the
most recent comprehensive discussion, see VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 6.
64. See MARTHA CRAVEN NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE (2006); THOMAS WINFRIED
MENKO POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 211-80 (1989).
65.

See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-23 (rev. ed. 1999).

66.

Id. at 118.
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principles that would be chosen behind the veil qualify as fair, because they
ensure that outcomes are not a product of factors or considerations that are
irrelevant from the moral point of view. 67
Scholars who are attracted to this approach may also want to suppose that
choosers are made ignorant of the nation in which they might find
themselves. 68 If deprived of that information, what distributive principles
would they select? It is possible that in the international context, as in the
domestic one, they would select welfarist principles. Perhaps people would
choose to maximize overall welfare, if placed behind the veil. 69 But it is also
possible that people behind the veil would take particular care to protect the
least well-off, perhaps through a version of Rawls' difference principle, which
permits inequalities only to the extent that they operate to the advantage of the
least advantaged.70 There is a vigorous debate over the application of that
principle or imaginable variations to the international domain.71 Rawls himself
believed that there would be real difficulties in adapting the difference principle
to the international context. 72 But even in that context, the idea of a veil of
ignorance may turn out to be helpful.73 Some philosophers believe that the best
approach specifies a floor constraint, ensuring that everyone is elevated above
some threshold.74 Even without a floor constraint, international agreements
might be developed with close attention to the veil of ignorance, which may
75
well require a great deal of redistribution across national boundaries.
We need not pause over the philosophical complexities here. 76 The basic
point is that welfarism is rejected by many people who believe that severe
deprivation for some cannot be justified by large welfare benefits for many.
Furthermore, fairness is often taken to require attention to those who face such
77
deprivation, whatever the welfarist calculus suggests.
Consider a common-sense specification of this claim, adapted to the

67. Id.
68. See POGGE, supra note 64, at 211-236.
69. Cf John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality, 69
AMER. POL. Sci. REV. 594 (1975) (arguing that people would choose to maximize average utility,
behind the veil of ignorance).
70. See RAWLS, supra note 65 at 65-70.
71. For varying perspectives, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 64, at 273-324; POGGE, supra note
64.
72. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999).
73. See id.; POGGE, supra note 64.
74. NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE (1992) (finding that
people would choose to maximize utility with a floor constraint, behind an experimental effort to
mimic the veil of ignorance); cf NUSSBAUM, supra note 64, at 291-95 (discussing idea of
threshold).
75. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 64.
76. For a detailed treatment, see id. at 291-324.
77. Welfarism will also be rejected by those who believe that principles of justice do not
extend across borders. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 65 at 7; Thomas Nagel, The Problem of
Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113 (2005).
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climate change problem. Some nations are much richer than others, in a way
78
that violates the requirements of justice. Perversely, the status quo approach
creates a kind of entitlement to the continuation of practices that violate those
requirements. No such entitlement can be defended. Even if corrective justice
does not require high-emissions states to compensate those nations that are at
special risk, 7 9 a climate change agreement would be unacceptably unfair if it
made development more difficult for poor nations. Such an agreement would
be especially unfair because development is designed to remove citizens in
poor nations from difficult conditions, and to allow poor nations to achieve
something closer to parity with wealthy nations. A per capita approach would
be the most fair under this analysis, because it counts every citizen as no less
and no more0 than one, in a way that respects the moral irrelevance of national
boundaries. 8
We do not intend to challenge these general points about fairness here.
Rather, our basic claim is that if these points are meant to provide a defense of
the per capita approach, they run into serious difficulties. The reason is that the
central objections to the welfarist argument rematerialize when fairness,
understood in the ways sketched above, is our guide. First, to the extent that
some of the most populous states are wealthy, the per capita approach is not
fair at all since it has some of the same vices as the status quo approach.
Second, per capita allocations have the disadvantage of giving large numbers of
permits to highly populated nations that have relatively little to lose from
climate change. Finally, it remains true that permits are allocated to the
governments of poor states, not to the citizens of poor states, and allocations to
such governments may not help those who are most in need.
2. The atmosphere as common property
There is another type of fairness argument that has been made about
emissions rights. The atmosphere, with its beneficial carbon-absorbing
81
characteristics, is common property, belonging to everyone in the world. A
climate treaty would close this commons, converting it into private property. It
is only fair to distribute the parcels of property to the former users of the
commons, namely, everyone in the world, on a per capita basis.
One might draw an analogy to minerals discovered in the sea bed under
the high seas, which are outside the sovereignty of any country. The
Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that revenues from exploitation of

78. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 64.
79. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 41.
80. See, e.g., Altamirano-Cabrera & Finus, supra note 6 (arguing for one person, one vote
analogy); Paul Baer et al., Equity and Greenhouse Gas Responsibility, 289 SCIENCE 2287 (2000)
(arguing that the per capita approach is justified by the principle of "equal rights").
See, e.g., Grubb et al., supra note 18, at 318-19; Ott& Sachs, supra note 6, at 168.
81.
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these minerals should be distributed "equitably." 82 But the analogy is at best
incomplete and in fact reveals the limits of the common property argument. A
climate treaty, like a treaty allowing for the exploitation of minerals, has two
effects of present interest. First, both treaties generate revenues: for permit
sellers, in the climate case, and for mining companies, in the mineral case.
Second, both treaties generate benefits for consumers: people benefit from
abatement of climate change, and people benefit from the lower price of, say,
oil. Because virtually everyone benefits from lower oil prices, the effect is
spread around the world. Thus, the only remaining question in the case of the
mineral treaty is how to distribute revenues fairly. In the climate case, the
climate effects are extremely variable-hurting some people very badly, having
no effect on others, and benefiting still others. 83 From the standpoint of
fairness, it would be strange to ignore these harmful effects while considering
only the revenue effects. The analogy to common property is not helpful; it
distracts from the relevant question, which is the distribution of all treaty
effects across the world's population.
3. Treatment of the similarly situated
Suppose that we understand the idea of fairness not in redistributive terms,
but as a requirement that similarly situated people be treated similarly. As we
saw above, the per capita approach is not attentive to the differential
distributional effects of climate change and abatement costs, but in effect gives
every person the same asset. From one perspective, the main objection to this
feature of the per capita system is that it means that wealth does not necessarily
go to the poor. But holding wealth constant, it might also seem unfair that
frugal individuals who have produced low levels of greenhouse gas emissions
receive the same payout as profligates who have produced high levels. And it
might also seem unfair that people who are most hurt by climate change receive
the same payout as those who are least hurt (or even benefited) by climate
change. Finally, we might think people who are most hurt by the abatement
efforts mandated by the climate treaty should receive some kind of
compensation. Consider, for example, low-income workers who commute to
work and must pay higher bus fares or fuel prices. One might argue that
fairness requires that these people receive permits, so that they do not bear a
disproportionate cost of the treaty regime.

82.
83.

See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 20.
One might argue that minerals extracted pursuant to a treaty will have differential

effects, mainly benefiting those who already have a high demand for the mineral. We suspect that,
in practice, the drafters of the Law of the Sea Convention anticipated that the overall effect of a
mineral discovery on worldwide prices will be slight; but to the extent that this is not the case,
then those differential effects should be taken into account in order to determine equitable
distribution.
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C. The Per CapitaApproach as an Incompletely Theorized Agreement
We have seen that in principle, significant global redistribution is
plausibly justified by considerations of both welfare and fairness. But in
practice, such redistribution does not occur. For example, there is no evidence
that the United States wants to transfer hundreds of billions of dollars to poor
people in India or China rather than the tens of millions of dollars that are
currently appropriated.84 In these circumstances, defenders of per capita
allocations might argue that their approach has three virtues. First, the per
capita approach might be feasible even if a preferred form of redistribution is
not. Second, such an approach might provide the basis for a kind of
incompletely theorized agreement among those who have different moral
commitments, or who are unsure about the appropriate moral commitments in
the international domain. Third, per capita allocation might, because of its
simplicity and attractiveness, provide a plausible focal point for political action,
a basis for an international agreement to which many nations could subscribe,
even if it would be fanciful to suggest that wealthy nations might sign an
international agreement85in which they agree to transfer hundreds of billions of
dollars to poor nations.
We will return to feasibility in the next Section. For the moment, let us
add a further consideration. Wealthy nations, including the United States, face
serious risks from climate change, and to reduce those risks, they need
international cooperation. Indeed, it is increasingly clear that they need
cooperation from the developing world. To obtain that cooperation, they might
well be willing to expend resources that they would not give in foreign aid.
86
Consider some illustrative numbers. Suppose that the United States would
lose 3 percent in annual GDP from "business as usual," in the form of no
international agreement at all. Suppose that the ideal international agreement
would cost the United States 0.5 percent in annual GDP, while reducing the 3
percent loss to a 1 percent loss, for a net gain of 1.5 percent. Suppose, however,
that developing countries reject this agreement, on the ground that its costs are
too high and its benefits too low, and that developing nations seek either an
agreement with different content or with some kind of financial assistance. The
different content might mean a worse cost-benefit ratio for the United States.
On the stipulated numbers, the United States should be willing to pay up to 1.5
percent of annual GDP to obtain the benefits of an international agreement.
84. The United States awarded $23 million in aid to China for democracy, human rights,
and rule of law programs, and $125 million in aid to India in 2006. See THOMAS LUM, CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, U.S. FOREIGN AID TO EAST AND SOUTH ASIA: SELECTED RECIPIENTS

14,

2

29 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL3136 .pdf.
85. See, e.g., Grubb et al., supra note 18, at 319.
86. For a study suggesting that the numbers here are in a plausible general ballpark, see
DALE W. JORGENSON ET AL., PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, U.S. MARKET
CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (2004), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/

global-warming-in-depth/allreports/marketconsequences.
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And indeed, there is evidence that wealthy nations are willing to pay nontrivial
amounts to poorer ones in return for their cooperation in international
agreements. 87
Whatever its implications, this argument does not support a per capita
approach at all. All that this argument says is that any climate agreement will
create a surplus, and it will be necessary, and possibly very difficult, for nations
to decide how to divide that surplus. If the United States would gain a great
deal from a treaty, while a poor nation such as China would gain a lot less, it
might be necessary for the United States to accept a smaller portion of the
surplus than China obtains, even to gain less on a per capita basis than China
does. Meanwhile, India might lose more than the United States does, and these
bargaining dynamics might work out in the United States' favor as between
these two states. In principle, relative wealth should matter to the distribution of
the surplus. Whether on grounds of welfare or fairness, poor countries should
be entitled to a significant share, perhaps through financial assistance or some
kind of side payment. But there is no particular reason to think that the type of
bargain that is welfare-maximizing, fair, or feasible should reflect relative
population size rather than another factor such as relative size of economy or
relative advantages from a climate treaty.
A similar point could be made about the possibility that the per capita
approach could reflect an incompletely theorized agreement. Suppose that
nations acknowledge that certain moral principles do, or should, guide
international relations, but that they disagree about what those moral principles
are. 88 If one believes the rhetoric of governments, one can identify a set of
standard moral arguments. Among developing nations, some argue that the rich
world has obligations to the poor arising from the history of colonial
exploitation. 89 Others argue that rich nations have obligations arising from
particular policies that they have adopted in the recent past and that continue in
the present, such as unfair trade rules and the treatment of debt. 90 Still others
argue simply that resources that exist outside the sovereign territory of each
state should be shared. 91 Some rich nations are willing to acknowledge that
they have an ethical obligation to provide aid to the very poorest people. Others
say that they have an obligation to cooperate with poor nations, or at least not
to interfere with them, but not necessarily to provide aid. 92

87. See BARRETT, supra note 21, at 335-54 (2003) (discussing side-payments).
88. For a discussion of various possible moral positions, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 64, at
273-324.
89. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council [UNHRC], Report of the Working Group on the Right to
Development, 19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/47 (Mar. 14, 2007).
90. Id. at
18; see also Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between
Rhetoric and Reality, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137, 141-42 (2004).
91.
See, e.g., Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 20.
92. These acknowledgements can be found, in vague terms, in such documents as
Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 97th plen.
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Observe that these different moral arguments have very different
implications. Even among the poor nations, whose views seem consistent at
first sight, one can detect radically different implications of the different
arguments. If one focuses on colonial exploitation, then the major beneficiaries
should be former colonies (including rich states like Taiwan), and the major
payers should be former empires (including Great Britain, Russia, and Portugal
but not so much the United States). Moreover, the idea of colonial exploitation
suggests that former colonies should direct their claims at their former masters,
not to the rich world as a whole. India's extra permits, for example, should
come out of Great Britain's pocket. Similarly, if tariff policy is the source of
complaints, one would need to determine which tariff policies were supported
by whom, and which countries they harmed, which would be a highly complex
and controversial process. And if tariff polices that have adverse effects on
other nations (and what tariff policies do not have such effects?) should count,
so should all other policies that have given rise to legitimate grievances. One
would thus need to keep in mind the particular grievances that some poor
countries have against other poor countries (India and Pakistan, Rwanda and
Burundi), and allocate permits accordingly.
Even if the rich nations owe extra permits to poor nations, within the class
of poor nations permits would have to be distributed unequally to account for
current and past injustices. Generous treatment, such as many rich nations'
contributions to the victims of the tsunami in South Asia in 2004, would need
to be subtracted, lest rich nations hoard their generous impulses as offsets to
permit regimes. And all of this would need to be done in a manner that
on grounds solely of
respected the views of those who care about redistribution
93
maximization.
welfare
or
redistributive justice
Within countries, moral disagreement of this type does not necessarily
preclude policy-making, even on issues that divide people sharply along moral
lines. Typically, the policy that emerges reflects an incompletely theorized
agreement. 94 People with different moral views can agree on a policy
consistent with their different interests and different moral views, while
bracketing their remaining conflicts or putting them off until a later time. For
example, in the United States some people support affirmative action as a way
to overcome past injustices, while others defend it as a forward-looking policy
95
for promoting certain social goals, such as stability. The moral views have
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (Dec. 4, 1986), and World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25,
1993).
1993, Vienna Declarationand ProgrammeofAction, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (July 12,
93. For an effort to derive a distribution system that takes into account historical behavior,
see Sagar, supra note 6.
AND
94. On such agreements in general, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING
international
for
grounding
theoretical
concrete
of
lack
the
On
(1996).
CONFLICT
POLITICAL
agreements, see BARRETT, supranote 21.
95. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action
Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986).
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different implications for how affirmative action should be designed and how
long it will last, but those holding these different views can sometimes agree
enough to put their weight behind a program that furthers some of their goals
but not others. Similarly, one might argue that the per capita approach could
reflect an incompletely theorized agreement among nations and individuals
with different but overlapping moral views about what nations owe each other.
This argument also is weak. None of the moral views described above
would support the claim that greenhouse gas permits should be distributed
according to population size, with the possible exception of the view that
commons should be shared. But even that view does not clearly distinguish
between per nation sharing and per capita sharing. If there is a common thread
among these theories, it is the view that richer nations have an ethical
obligation to aid or cooperate with poor nations. But as we have seen, poor
nations and populous nations are not necessarily the same.
IV
FEASIBILITY ISSUES WITH THE PER CAPITA APPROACH

Thus far our focus has been on issues of principle. A general lesson has
been that there are reasons for significant redistribution to poor people in poor
nations on grounds of either welfare or fairness. In light of such justifications,
the redistributive approach seems far better than the per capita approach, which
seems in turn to be far better than the status quo approach. The main objection
to the redistributive approach involves incentive effects. The question is
whether the welfare loss from such effects outweighs the welfare gain from
redistribution. It is entirely plausible to think that a climate change agreement
that includes significant redistribution will be better, on welfarist grounds, than
one that does not. But any climate change agreement must also be feasible, and
the constraints of feasibility impose significant restrictions on the pursuit of
ideals. The poignant irony is that insistence on the first-best outcome, as a
matter of principle, may make the climate change problem intractable, in a way
that could lead to disaster from the standpoint of the very nations that are
96
poorest and most vulnerable.
A. State Consent and InternationalParetianism
Any realistic approach to climate regulation will have to come about
through changes in international law. Most serious discussion today focuses on
a possible climate treaty because no nation can make a serious dent in
anticipated warming on its own. 97 The United Nations Framework Convention

96. India is the most obvious example here, because it is unusually vulnerable to damage
from climate change and also most insistent on per capita allocations. On India's vulnerability, see
NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 5, at 91.
97. See NORDHAUS supra note 10; Posner & Sunstein, supra note 41.
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on Climate Change of 1992 set the stage for negotiations that culminated in the
Kyoto Protocol of 1997.98 The treaty mandated that developed nations cut
greenhouse gas emissions over a period of years, but imposed no emissions
99
reductions obligations on developing nations. The United States refused to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol, in part because the treaty obligated the United States
to make quite significant emissions cuts, thereby imposing costs much greater,
in terms of monetary expense, than those imposed on other nations. 100 In the
most recent round of negotiations at Bali in 2007, the United States agreed to
resume negotiations, with an eye toward joining a new treaty that would
binding greenhouse gas emission abatement obligations a few years
provide 0for
1
hence. 1
The difficulty of obtaining the consent of the United States to an
international agreement illustrates an important point: because treaties require
the consent of treaty partners, states must believe that by entering a treaty they
are serving their national interests. Of course the idea of national interest can be
specified in many different ways. But as a first approximation, nations
primarily care about the welfare of their own citizens, not necessarily about the
1 02
A workable climate treaty will have to
welfare of citizens of other countries.
be one that not only serves the interests of the United States, but also the
interests of other major industrial nations, including developing countries such
as China and Brazil. We have used the term International Paretianism to refer
to this pragmatic constraint on treaty-making: a treaty is not possible unless it
makes all its signatories better off.
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that we reject
International Paretianism in principle. From a welfarist perspective, a step such
as genocide prevention might be justified even if its national benefits are
exceeded by its national costs, so long as the global benefits exceed the global
costs. Nor do we insist that International Paretianism is always a firm constraint
on domestic judgments. It is imaginable, for example, that domestic forces will
favor at least some degree of altruism, so that nations will take steps that
promote global welfare without promoting domestic welfare. The only point is
that domestic self-interest imposes a significant limitation on what is feasible,
and that nations should not be expected to sign a climate change agreement
from which they are large-scale net losers. China is not likely to sign an

98. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3.
99. For valuable discussion, see SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE? (2007).
100. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 91-93.
101. See Bali Action Plan, supra note 9.
102. The best evidence for this proposition is the pattern of foreign aid. Poor countries,
understandably, do not provide foreign aid, but middle-income countries also do not seem to feel
that they have a responsibility to help people living in poorer countries. Rich countries provide
foreign aid but are not generous, and scholars have shown that much (but not all) foreign aid can
be traced to specific strategic interests. See, e.g., Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, Who Gives
Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?, 5 J. ECON. GROWTH 33, 55-56 (2000).
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agreement that would cost it, on net, hundreds of billions of dollars each year;
the same is true of the United States. An important question, then, is whether a
proposed allocation of emissions rights will require one nation to give a great
deal, in monetary terms, to others.
Even if nations care only about their economic well-being, they might
well be willing to join a suitably designed climate treaty. Scientific and
economic models indicate that, most likely, substantial cuts in greenhouse gas
emissions will produce global benefits in excess of global costs. 103 For
purposes of producing agreement, a main problem is that climate change will
affect different nations differently, with some being harmed a great deal, and
others being harmed relatively little, at least over the next one hundred years. 104
For example, the United States gains less from a treaty than India and African
nations, for example, simply because it has far less to lose from climate
change. 10 5 If a specified level of reductions will give significant benefits to
India and Pakistan, but more modest benefits to the United States and Russia,
the latter nations might well be reluctant to accept that level of reductions, and
might demand some kind of compensation. 106
Even more troublesome, restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions will
probably be most costly for high-emissions nations, including the United
States. 107 Indeed, the United States would have borne at least half of the total
worldwide cost of the Kyoto Protocol, and perhaps significantly more than
that-a point that helps explain its unwillingness to ratify the treaty. 108 Large
emitters, facing significant costs from emissions reductions requirements,
therefore will be unlikely to join a treaty unless the treaty uses their status quo
emissions as the baseline from which to determine cuts. As a practical matter,
nations that are already the biggest greenhouse gas emitters will not join a
treaty that requires them to reduce their emissions to the level of very poor
nations; nor would they enter a treaty that requires them to pay a lot of money
09
for permits distributed to poor nations. 1
The pragmatic virtue of the status quo approach is that it takes seriously
these political constraints on treaty-making. The corresponding problem with
the per capita approach is that it would require smaller industrial states to buy
103.

For different perspectives converging on this general conclusion, see, for example,
10; NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2007).
104. See NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 5, at 91.
105. Id.
106. Note in this connection that as a price for their agreement to participate in the Kyoto
Protocol, Russia and Eastern Europe received emissions rights worth over $100 billion. See
SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 92.
107. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Complex Climate Change Incentives of China and the
NORDHAUS, supra note

United States, 55 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
108. See STEWART & WIENER, supra note 1, at 49-52.

109. The qualification, of course, is that if technological innovation sharply drives down
the cost of emissions reductions, large emitting nations will be more willing to accept significant
restrictions. But there is no sign, at the present, of any such innovation.
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permits from larger developing states, violating International Paretianism.
There is little reason that the rich states would be willing to agree to such an
approach. The behavior of the United States, with respect to the Kyoto
Protocol, is revealing in this regard. The United States would have had to spend
over $300 billion to comply with its obligations; 11° it is no accident that no
member of the United States Senate, Democratic or Republican, supported
ratification. 111
To be sure, most wealthy nations send foreign aid to developing nations,
so it would be a mistake to define their national interests in purely economic
terms. 112 We have noted that nations are capable of being altruistic. A
country's national interest might be understood as some combination of
altruistic and economic interests. The nature of this combination will vary with
domestic political pressures. To the extent that powerful domestic
constituencies want to assist those in other nations, the altruistic elements will
be magnified. One might argue that, given the current level of altruism, nations
would be willing to adopt the per capita approach.
The problem is that the existing level of foreign aid is probably not greatly
lower than the amount that rich states are willing to pay in order to be altruistic.
Such nations are unlikely to agree to massive increases in the redistribution of
wealth by entering a climate treaty that requires them to bear most of the cost
of greenhouse gas abatement. One risk is that if they agree to a treaty that
redistributes wealth, rich states will be tempted to cut back on foreign aid, so
that the redistributive effect of the treaty will be minimal or zero. Consider a
few numbers in this regard. In 2006, the United States gave almost $24 billion
in foreign aid (a third of which was to Iraq). 1 3 As noted, the politically
unacceptable Kyoto Protocol would have cost the United States over $300
billion over the indefinite future, the equivalent of perhaps tens of billions of
dollars per year. 114 The per capita approach, as compared to the status quo
approach, would cost the United States far more than that: as much as $100
billion per year for the indefinite future. 1 15 There is no sign that the United
States would be willing to pay that amount, well in excess of its existing
foreign aid budget, as part of a climate change agreement.
In sum, the feasibility problem with the per capita approach is that it
conflicts with the state system that currently organizes the world. States might
well be willing to enter a climate treaty that mitigates climate change if the
treaty creates restrictions that work off existing levels of greenhouse gas

110. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 95.
111. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
112. See Alesina & Dollar, supra note 102.
113. See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. [OECD], Dev. Assistance Comm. [DAC],
U.S. Aid At-a-Glance (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/30/40039096.gif.
114. See NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 5, at 166.
115. See supra note 29.
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emissions. Doing so would serve their national interests. But given the current
level of altruism that appears to exist, they are highly unlikely to adopt a
distributive goal like that mandated by the per capita approach. To insist on the
per capita approach, then, is most likely to subvert the best chance1 1for
a climate
6
treaty and hence to render the climate change problem intractable.
B. Defective Governance and Alternative Means to Redistribute
As is well known in the development literature, redistributing wealth to
poor nations is not easy or obvious. 117 Large cash grants to governments are
often siphoned off by corrupt officials. Loans are similarly abused and often
not repaid. Grants and loans not lost to corruption are nonetheless often wasted
because the recipient government lacks the expertise and institutional capacity
to identify problems, monitor the disbursement of funds, and use them
wisely. 118 Donors have devised numerous means for monitoring and
controlling the use of funds, but these often fail and frequently generate
resentment. In some cases, donors misunderstand the needs of the recipient
countries and squander funds on projects that do not help people who live
there; in other cases, donors impose conditions that are politically controversial
and even destabilizing. 119 Donors have also tried to circumvent corrupt or inept
governments by directing aid to individuals and NGOs rather than
governments. But small recipients are hard to monitor and control and have
limited impact, and aid programs involving multiple recipients are difficult to
coordinate. 120 Painful trial and error have suggested some promising
approaches, which emphasize decentralization, sensitivity to context, and
experimentation.1 2 1 Whatever the merits and demerits of these approaches, at
least they do not repeat the errors of the past.
Now consider a climate treaty, which most likely would require the
allocation of valuable permits to the governments of poor states, the same
corrupt or ineffective governments that have misused foreign aid. It seems

116. For a sophisticated demonstration of this problem, see Altamirano-Cabrera & Finus,
supra note 6 (arguing that equitable schemes are more likely to be unstable than "pragmatic"
schemes that take account of relative economic power).
117. For pessimistic empirical assessments of the relationship between aid and economic
growth, see Simeon Djankov et al., Does Foreign Aid Help?, 26 CATO J. 1 (2006); William
Easterly et al., Aid, Policies, and Growth: Comment, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 774 (2004); Robert J.
Barro & Jong-Wha Lee, IMF Programs: Who Is Chosen and What Are the Effects? (NBER
Working
Paper
No.
8951,
2002),
available
at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfn?abstractid=313652.
118. See, e.g., WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN 60-112 (2006).
119. Simeon Djankov et al., The Curse of Aid (Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper,
2006), availableat www.cato.org/pubs/journallcj26nl/cj26nl-1 .pdf.
120. See, e.g., Arnab Acharya et al., Aid Proliferation: How Responsible Are the Donors?
(IDS Working Paper No. 214, 2004), available at www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop/wp/wp214.pdf
(pointing out the costs to donee countries of dealing with multiple donors).
121.

See Easterly, supra note 11 7.
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misuse these permits as
highly likely that some of these governments would
122
cronies.
to
them
transferring
by
example,
for
well,
Even if the governments of developing countries are not corrupt, they will
still not necessarily use revenues from permits in the way that donor countries,
motivated by altruism, would approve. Recall that the per capita approach was
justified by redistributive concerns: all else being equal, a climate pact that
favored developing nations would be desirable. If large countries tend to be
poor, then the per capita approach has attractive redistributive features. The
redistributive approach is even better than the per capita approach, on this view.
But if the redistributive approach is not practicable, the per capita approach
might be second best.
Any realistic climate treaty will do no more than allocate permits to the
governments of developing nations. After -these nations sell the permits, they
will be free to use the revenue however they wish. But the governments of
developing nations are not particularly generous to their poor. In a state like
Guatemala, for example, taxes are low, apparently because wealthy people
disproportionately influence the political process. 123 It seems unlikely that the
Guatemalan government, having received a windfall of permits, would
redistribute the revenues to the poor. More likely, the government would
simply lower taxes on the wealthy even more. The per capita approach or
redistributive approach, therefore, would not end up helping the very poor;
these approaches would end up helping wealthy people who live in poor
countries.
Even worse, the development literature has identified the "resource
curse," the idea that poor states that enjoy rich natural resources do worse,
politically or economically, than poor states that do not. 24 Theories abound for
this phenomenon; one such theory is that a large pool of resources in a state
with poor institutions encourages insurgencies, since the insurgents can finance
the conflict by seizing control over the resources. The resource curse also has
been cited as a possible explanation for the ineffectiveness of foreign aid: a
windfall of foreign aid is like the discovery of oil, and may be similarly
destabilizing. 125 If this theory is right, distributing valuable permits to poor
countries may cause civil war rather than prosperity.
Whether these theories are sound or not, the point for present purposes is
that repeating the errors of development policy by using a climate treaty as an
opportunity to engage in foreign aid would be hazardous. The distribution of
122. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 41.
123. See, e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Council [UNHRC], Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Civil and Political Rights, Including the
Questions of Disappearancesand Summary Executions, Addendum, Mission to Guatemala (21-25
58-61, U.N. Doe. A/HRC/4/20/Add.2 (Feb. 19, 2007) (prepared by Philip
August 2006),
Alston).
124. See AUTY, supra note 58.
125. See Djankov,supra note 119.
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permits on a per capita basis, in order to favor poor states, would be just such
an effort. If giving piles of cash to poor states has failed to help them, then
giving them piles of permits will also fail to help them. To the extent that this is
so, they should receive no more permits than are necessary to induce them to
internalize the external climate effects of polluting activity.
CONCLUSION

From the standpoint of both welfare and fairness, there are strong
arguments for large amounts of international redistribution. If resources from
wealthy people in wealthy nations could be transferred to poor people in poor
nations, global welfare would be significantly increased. At the same time,
arguments from fairness suggest that people should not have far worse
prospects in life simply because of the nation in which they are born. These
arguments have led many analysts to suggest that the per capita approach is the
best way to allocate greenhouse gas emission rights. In the developing world,
that approach has widespread support, 126 and there is no question that it will be
pressed aggressively in international negotiations.
We have urged that claims from both welfare and fairness fail to provide
strong justifications for the per capita approach. A central problem is that some
wealthy nations have large populations and some poor nations have small
populations. Per capita allocations of emissions rights would result in
substantial benefits for China and India, both of which are poor. But many
nations are significantly poorer than those nations, and a directly redistributive
approach would be a far more effective way of assisting those who need help.
Moreover, any international agreement will benefit some nations more than
others and cost some nations more than others. In these circumstances, the per
capita approach gives the appearance, not the reality, of fairness.
It remains true that from the standpoint of welfare and fairness, per capita
allocations would be far better than the status quo approach. But here, as
elsewhere, the best is the enemy of the good. A climate treaty that included the
optimal level of emissions would be good. A climate treaty that included the
optimal level of emissions reductions and the optimal level of redistribution
would be better still. But such a treaty is much less likely to be possible. On
welfarist grounds, and putting incentive effects to one side, the redistributive
approach is superior to the per capita approach, which is in turn superior to the
status quo approach. Unfortunately, the best approaches in principle are also
least likely to be feasible in practice.
We have not attempted here to say exactly how emissions rights should be
allocated; our modest goal has been to challenge the widely held view that per
capita allocations should be the foundation for an international agreement. But
a more general point does emerge, and it is ironic and potentially even tragic.
126.

See

VANDERHEIDEN,

supra note 6, at 66-69.
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Because of the constraints of feasibility, the insistence by poor nations on the
best approaches in principle would likely undermine current efforts to convince
the world to take significant steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions-and as
very nations that are especially vulnerable to
a result would most harm those
127
change.
climate
of
the effects

127.
REPORT,

For a clear demonstration of their greater vulnerability, see
supra note 40.
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